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ABSTRACT
Not necessarily. The fundamental value of a firm increases with uncertainty about average future
profitability, and this uncertainty was unusually high in the late 1990s. We calibrate a stock
valuation model that includes this uncertainty, and show that the uncertainty needed to match the
observed Nasdaq valuations at their peak is high but plausible. The high uncertainty might also
explain the unusually high return volatility of Nasdaq stocks in the late 1990s. Uncertainty has the
biggest effect on stock prices when the equity premium is low.
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pietro.veronesi@gsb.uchicago.edu\Before we relegate a speculative event to the fundamentally inexplicable or bubble category driven by
crowd psychology, however, we should exhaust the reasonable economic explanations... \bubble" characteri-
zations should be a last resort because they are non-explanations of events, merely a name that we attach to
a ¯nancial phenomenon that we have not invested su±ciently in understanding." Garber (2000, p.124)
1. Introduction
On March 10, 2000, the Nasdaq Composite Index closed at its all-time high of 5,048.62.
For comparison, the same index stood at 1,114 in August 1996 as well as in October 2002.
The unusual rise and fall in the prices of technology stocks has led many academics and
practitioners to describe the event as a stock price \bubble." 1 This label seems appropriate
if the term \bubble" is interpreted as an ex post description of an extended rise in prices
followed by a sharp fall (e.g., Kindleberger, 1978). However, a more common interpretation
is that the prices of technology stocks exceeded their fundamental values in the late 1990s.
This paper challenges the notion that technology stocks were overvalued at that time.
To analyze whether stocks are fairly priced, one needs a model of the fundamental value.
We argue that the models that have been used to value technology stocks omit an important
determinant of the fundamental value, namely the uncertainty about a ¯rm's average future
pro¯tability, which can also be thought of as the uncertainty about the average future growth
rate of the ¯rm's book value. This uncertainty raises the ¯rm's fundamental value, as shown
by P¶ astor and Veronesi (2003). We argue that the late 1990s witnessed high uncertainty
about the average growth rates of technology ¯rms, and that this uncertainty was partly
responsible for the high level of technology stock prices.
To illustrate why uncertainty about a ¯rm's growth rate raises the ¯rm's fundamental
value, consider the Gordon growth model, P=D =1 =(r¡g), where P is the stock price, D is
the next period's dividend, r is the discount rate, and g is the dividend growth rate. If g is
uncertain, then P=D is equal to the expectation of 1=(r¡g), under the conditions discussed
in the Appendix. This expectation increases with uncertainty about g,b e c a u s e1 =(r ¡ g)i s
convex in g.2 Loosely speaking, a ¯rm with some probability of failing (a very low g)a n d
some probability of becoming the next Microsoft (a very high g) is very valuable.3
1See, for example, Thaler (1999), Shiller (2000), Ofek and Richardson (2002, 2003), Ritter and Warr
(2002), Ritter and Welch (2002), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Brunnermeier and Nagel (2003),
Ljungqvist and Wilhelm (2003), and Stein (2004).
2P¶ astor and Veronesi (2003) discuss why uncertainty about g does not a®ect r in their model. Veronesi
(2000) shows that P=D is convex in g also in a general equilibrium model in which uncertainty does a®ect r.
3Interestingly, Bill Miller, portfolio manager of the Legg Mason Value Trust, used similar logic to justify
the valuation of Amazon.com in 1999: \...being wrong isn't very costly, and being right has a high payo®...
With Amazon, we believe the payo® for being right is high." Amazon's Allure..., Barron's, 15 Nov 1999.
1Ofek and Richardson (2002) argue that the earnings of Internet ¯rms would have to grow
at implausibly high rates to justify the Internet stock prices in the late 1990s. Their argument
implicitly assumes that the earnings growth rate is known. However, when uncertainty about
the growth rate is acknowledged, the observed price can be justi¯ed with a signi¯cantly lower
expected growth rate. For example, consider a stock with r = 20% and P=Dof 50. To match
the observed P=D in the Gordon formula with a known value of g, the required dividend
growth rate is g = 18%. Suppose instead that g is unknown and drawn from a uniform
distribution with a standard deviation of 4%. The expected g required to match the P=D












so simply plugging the expected growth rate, E(g), into the Gordon formula understates the
P=D ratio. This understatement is especially large when uncertainty about g is large.
Although the Gordon model conveys our basic idea, it is not well suited for pricing
technology ¯rms, because many of those ¯rms pay no dividends. To avoid this problem, we
develop a stock valuation model that focuses on the ratio of the market value to book value
of equity (M/B) instead of the price-dividend ratio. In our closed-form pricing formula,
M/B is an increasing function of uncertainty about the average growth rate of the ¯rm's
book value. The pricing formula can be inverted to compute \implied uncertainty," i.e., the
level of uncertainty that sets the ¯rm's model-implied M/B equal to the observed M/B.
We calibrate the valuation model, and compute the implied uncertainty of the Nasdaq-
traded ¯rms on March 10, 2000. We argue that this uncertainty is plausible because it
implies return volatility that is close to the volatility observed in the data. The Nasdaq
stock prices in the late 1990s were not only high but also highly volatile, and both facts
are consistent with high uncertainty about average pro¯tability. We conclude that Nasdaq
prices at the peak of the \bubble" are justi¯able in our rational valuation model.
We also examine the time variation in implied uncertainty. First, we extract the time
series of the equity premium from the observed valuations of the NYSE and Amex stocks,
assuming that those stocks are fairly priced with no uncertainty. Given the equity premium,
we construct the time series of implied uncertainty for the Nasdaq index as a whole. We ¯nd
that this uncertainty increased dramatically in the late 1990s, and declined thereafter.
Consistent with this pattern in implied uncertainty, there are good reasons to believe
that uncertainty about the growth rates of technology ¯rms was unusually high in the late
1990s. The past decade witnessed rapid technological progress, especially in the Internet
2and telecom industries. Technological revolutions are likely to be accompanied by high
uncertainty about future growth. When old paradigms are fading away and a \new era"
is being embraced, uncertainty increases because the historical experience is discounted.
The popular press contains numerous suggestions that investors appeared to be unusually
uncertain about future growth in the late 1990s.4
Empirical evidence also indicates high uncertainty about the average growth rates of
technology ¯rms at the end of the past decade. First, Nasdaq return volatility increased
dramatically in the late 1990s and declined after year 2000, both in absolute terms and
relative to the NYSE/Amex volatility. Second, the dispersion of pro¯tability across Nasdaq
stocks also increased in the late 1990s and declined afterwards. Third, the stock price
reaction to earnings announcements was unusually strong in the late 1990s (e.g., Ahmed,
Schneible, and Stevens, 2003, and Landsman and Maydew, 2002), which is consistent with
high uncertainty because signals elicit large revisions in beliefs when prior uncertainty is
high. Fourth, technology ¯rms went public unusually early in their life-cycles in the late
1990s (e.g., Schultz and Zaman, 2001). Uncertainty about the average growth rates of ¯rms
with short earnings track records should be especially high. Finally, P¶ astor and Veronesi
(2004) argue that high uncertainty about the average pro¯tability of new ¯rms attracted
many private ¯rms to go public at the end of the past decade.
The turn of the millenium can be characterized not only by high uncertainty but also
by a low equity premium. Although the academics do not agree on the exact magnitude of
the premium, they tend to agree that the premium was relatively low in the late 1990s (e.g.,
Welch, 2001). We argue that the low equity premium ampli¯ed the e®ect of uncertainty on
stock prices in the late 1990s. In the Gordon formula, the convexity of P=D in g is strongest
when r is low, and the same intuition holds in our model. When the discount rate is low, a
large fraction of the ¯rm value comes from earnings in the distant future, and those earnings
are the most a®ected by uncertainty about the ¯rm's average future growth rate.
Two recent studies provide di®erent explanations for the high valuations of technology
stocks in the late 1990s. According to Ofek and Richardson (2003), these valuations were
high partly due to short-sale constraints. According to Cochrane (2002), technology stocks
were valued highly because they had high convenience yields. Neither study demonstrates
that the magnitudes of these e®ects could be large enough to justify the observed valuations
4E.g., \...the projections of revenue growth were, by and large, wild guesses." New Economy, Bad Math, ...
Avital Louria Hahn, Investment Dealers Digest, 23 October 2000. E.g., \The problem is that since we know
so little about where the Net is headed, predicting cash °ow so far into the future is largely meaningless...
investing in this new technology was a bet..." You Believe? ... Fortune Magazine, June 7, 1999. Trueman
(2001) discusses the Internet ¯rms' \highly unpredictable growth rates."
3of Nasdaq ¯rms. In contrast, our calibration shows that the e®ect of uncertainty can be
strong enough to rationalize those valuations. Moreover, neither of the two studies explains
why the prices of technology stocks were so volatile at that time. In our model, the high
return volatility is a natural consequence of high uncertainty.
In another related study, Schwartz and Moon (2000) argue that the observed valuations
of the Internet stocks can be rationalized by revenue growth that is both su±ciently high
and su±ciently volatile. They calibrate their model to match the valuation of Amazon.com,
but they report that the implied return volatility is too high, and they also ¯nd the implied
revenue distribution unrealistic. Our model, which is substantially di®erent from theirs,
produces distributions of returns and cash °ows that seem realistic.
This paper is also related to the theoretical literature on asset price bubbles, e.g., Allen
and Gorton (1993), Santos and Woodford (1997), Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003), Allen,
Morris, and Shin (2003), and Scheinkman and Xiong (2003). See Camerer (1989) and Brun-
nermeier (2001) for literature reviews. Also related is Garber (2000), who proposes rational
explanations (unrelated to ours) for the Dutch tulip mania of the 1630s and other histori-
cal \bubble" episodes. Donaldson and Kamstra (1996) develop a neural network model for
dividends, and use it to dismiss the idea of a stock price bubble in the 1920s.
We don't claim that investor behavior in the late 1990s was fully rational. Good examples
of apparent irrationality are presented by Cooper, Dimitrov, and Rau (2001), Lamont and
Thaler (2003), and others. Also, we don't attempt to rule out any behavioral explanations
for the \bubble." We only argue that such explanations are not necessary, because stock
prices in March 2000 are also consistent with a rational model. The notion of a Nasdaq
\bubble" caused by investor irrationality should not be held as a self-evident truth.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes our valuation model. Section 3
calibrates the model. Section 4 computes the implied uncertainty on March 10, 2000 for
the Nasdaq index as a whole, as well as for individual ¯rms such as Amazon, Cisco, Ebay,
and Yahoo. Section 5 examines the variation in implied uncertainty over time. Section 6
analyzes the cross-section of implied uncertainty. Section 7 concludes.
2. The Model
The stock valuation model developed in this section builds on the models of P¶ astor and
Veronesi (2003, 2004; henceforth PV). Let ½i
t = Y i
t =Bi
t denote ¯rm i's instantaneous prof-
itability at time t,w h e r eY i
t is the earnings rate and Bi
t is the book value of equity. We











dt + ¾i;0dW0;t + ¾i;idWi;t;Á
i > 0;t < T i; (2)
where W0;t and Wi;t are uncorrelated Wiener processes that capture the systematic (W0;t)
and ¯rm-speci¯c (Wi;t) components of the random shocks that drive the ¯rm's pro¯tability.
We also assume that the ¯rm's average pro¯tability, ½i
t, can be decomposed as
½
i
t = ½t + Ã
i
t: (3)
The common component, ½t, exhibits mean-reverting variation that re°ects business cycles:
d½t = kL (½L ¡ ½t)dt + ¾L;0dW0;t + ¾L;LdWL;t;k L > 0; (4)
where W0;t and WL;t are uncorrelated. The ¯rm-speci¯c component, Ã
i
t,w h i c hw er e f e rt o





tdt; kÃ > 0;t < T i: (5)
This assumption is made for analytical convenience. Assuming constant Ã
i
t would present
technical complications related to the transversality condition, as discussed later. From the
economic perspective, the gradual decay in average excess pro¯tability can be interpreted as
an outcome of slow-moving competitive market forces.
Competition in the ¯rm's product market can also arrive suddenly, at some random
future time Ti.W ea s s u m et h a tTi is exponentially distributed with density h(T i;p), so that
at any point in time, there is probability p that Ti arrives in the next instant. The sudden
entry of competition at time Ti eliminates the present value of the ¯rm's future abnormal
earnings, de¯ned as earnings in excess of those earned at the rate equal to the cost of capital.
As a result, the ¯rm's market value of equity at time Ti equals the book value, Mi
Ti = Bi
Ti.
This implication follows from the residual income model (e.g., Ohlson, 1995), in which the
market equity equals book equity plus the present value of future abnormal earnings.
We assume that the ¯rm pays out a constant fraction of its book equity in dividends,
Di
t = ciBi
t,w h e r eci ¸ 0: We refer to ci as the dividend yield, for simplicity. The ¯rm
is ¯nanced only by equity, and it issues no new equity. These assumptions are made for
analytical convenience; relaxing them would add complexity with no obvious new insights.5
5Debt ¯nancing can be allowed as long as its dynamics do not a®ect the ¯rm's pro¯tability process.
New equity can also in principle be issued. PV (2003) explain that if the ¯rm issues more equity when
expected pro¯ts are high and pays higher dividends when expected pro¯ts are low, then the ¯rm's market
value becomes even more convex in average pro¯tability. As a result, uncertainty about average pro¯tability
has an even bigger positive e®ect on ¯rm value, strengthening the message of this paper.
5Given these assumptions, the clean surplus relation implies that book equity grows at the
















































st = a0 + a1yt + a2y
2
t; (9)
dyt = ky (y ¡ yt)dt + ¾ydW0;t; (10)
d"t = ¹"dt + ¾"dW0;t: (11)
PV derive ¼t in equation (8) as an outcome of a habit persistence model, in which "t is log
aggregate consumption, and st is the log surplus consumption ratio introduced by Campbell
and Cochrane (1999). Similar SDFs have been used in the term structure literature (e.g.,
Constantinides, 1992). Given this speci¯cation, the equity premium varies over time due
to the time-varying risk aversion of the representative investor. As shown in the Appendix,
high values of yt imply a low volatility of the SDF, and thus a low equity premium.
2.1. Valuation





















,a n dt h eQ functions are de¯ned in the Appendix.
Proposition 1. Suppose that Ã
i




























This proposition serves as a benchmark for the more interesting case, analyzed next, in
which Ã
i
t is unobservable. According to Proposition 1, a ¯rm's M/B ratio is high if expected




t. As for the discount rate, M/B increases with yt in the plausible parameter
range: when yt is high, the equity premium is low and M/B is high. The dependence of
M/B on ci and p is unclear because Zi is decreasing in both variables. A higher dividend
yield increases near-term cash °ow, but it also reduces the growth rate of book value, so
the overall e®ect of ci on M/B is ambiguous. A higher p brings the terminal cash °ow (Bi
Ti)
closer in time, but it also shortens the expected period over which abnormal earnings can be
earned, so its e®ect on M/B depends on the parameter choices as well. For most reasonable
parameter values, however, M/B increases when p decreases.
Suppose now that Ã
i
t is unknown, and that the investors' beliefs about Ã
i
t can be sum-
marized by the probability density function ft(Ã
i







































t) is a convex function of Ã
i
t, more uncertainty about Ã
i
t (i.e., a mean-
preserving spread in Ã
i
t) implies a higher expected value of Gi(yt;½t;½ i
t;Ã
i
t), and thus a higher
M/B ratio. This relation holds for any distribution ft(Ã
i
t). To obtain a closed-form solution
f o rM / B ,w ea s s u m et h a tft(Ã
i
t)i sn o r m a l .
Proposition 2. Suppose that Ã
i





























T h ef a c tt h a tM / Bi n c r e a s e sw i t hb ¾i;t, uncertainty about Ã
i
t, is the key relation in the paper.
3. Calibration
In this section, we calibrate the model to match some key features of the data on asset
returns and pro¯tability. The parameters are summarized in Table 1.
We divide ¯rms into two groups, the \new economy" and the \old economy". For simplic-
ity, we assume that the new economy includes ¯rms traded on Nasdaq, and the old economy
includes ¯rms traded on the NYSE and Amex. The new economy ¯rms are described in
Section 2. The old economy's aggregate pro¯tability is given by ½t in equation (4). The
old economy pays aggregate dividends forever at the rate of DO
t = cOBO
t ,w h e r eBO
t is the
old economy's aggregate book value. We compute cO =5 :67% as the time-series average
7of the old economy's annual dividend yields, each of which is computed as the sum of the
current-year dividends across all NYSE/Amex ¯rms, divided by the sum of the book values









, and its M/B ratio is determined by the economy's pro¯tability





t =©( ½t;y t)( 1 6 )
An explicit formula for the function © is provided in Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
To estimate the process for ½t in equation (4), we compute the old economy's pro¯tability
as the sum of the current-year earnings across all NYSE/Amex stocks, divided by the sum
of the book values of equity at the end of the previous year. This time series is adjusted
for in°ation by using the GDP de°ator, obtained from NIPA. Equation (4) implies a normal
likelihood function for ½t, as described in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. Maximizing this





L;L. This estimate is split into its components, ¾L;0 =1 :47% and ¾L;L =
1:31% per year, by using the covariance of ½t with the SDF, which is discussed next.
The parameters of the SDF are chosen to produce reasonable properties for the returns
and M/B of the old economy, as well as for the risk-free rate. First, we construct the 1962-
2002 annual time series of the old economy's M/B ratio, by computing the ratio of the sums
of the market values and the most recent book values of equity across all NYSE/Amex ¯rms.
We then invert the pricing formula in equation (16) to obtain the time series of yt as a func-
tion of the old economy's M/B ratio, ½t, and the parameters £ = (´;°;y;ky;¾ y;¾ L;0;¾ L;L).
We estimate £ by GMM. The moment conditions are constructed from the stationary dis-
tribution of (½t;y t), obtained by substituting (½t;y t)f o rzt in Lemma 3 in the Appendix. We
also impose additional moment conditions to ensure that the average values of the estimated
equity premium ¹R;t, market return volatility ¾R;t,a n dt h er e a li n t e r e s tr a t erf;t are close
to the values observed in the data. The estimated parameters imply the average equity
premium of 5.06%, the average old-economy volatility of 14.47% per year, the average real
risk-free rate of 6.25% per year, and the average risk-free rate volatility of 1.55% per year.
In the process for Ã
i
t in equation (5), we set kÃ =0 :0139, which implies a half-life of 50
years. We choose such slow mean reversion for Ã
i
t so that Ã
i
t can be thought of as virtually
constant before time Ti; in fact, we drop the t subscript from Ã
i
t in the rest of the paper,
for simplicity. If we assumed Ã
i
to be literally constant, we would need to impose a ¯nite
6Throughout the paper, ¯rms are ordinary common shares (i.e., CRSP sharecodes 10 and 11).
8upper bound on the range of possible values of Ã
i
to ensure that prices are well de¯ned.
This upper bound would prevent us from using a normal distribution for Ã
i
, which would
complicate the analysis and make the pricing formulas less elegant. Nonetheless, we have
solved the model with constant Ã
i
under the assumption of a truncated normal distribution
for Ã
i
, and obtained the same conclusions throughout the paper.
4. Matching Nasdaq Prices on March 10, 2000
In this section, we examine the ability of our valuation model to match the prices of Nasdaq
stocks on March 10, 2000, the day when the Nasdaq index peaked.
4.1. Matching Nasdaq's Valuation
In this subsection, we view Nasdaq as one large ¯rm, whose pro¯tability ½N
t follows the
process (2).7 The parameters of this process are estimated by maximum likelihood. The





for zt in Lemma 3 in the Appendix,
taking as given the parameters of the ½t and yt processes described in Section 3. In the interest
of generality, we also allow ½N
t and ½t to be correlated beyond their common correlation with
yt. This procedure yields ÁN =0 :3667, ¾N;0 =2 :46%, and ¾N;N =4 :90% per year.
For each Nasdaq-traded ¯rm, we compute the market value of equity on March 10, 2000
by multiplying the share price by the number of shares outstanding, both obtained from
CRSP. Nasdaq's M/B ratio is the sum of the market values of all Nasdaq ¯rms on March
10, 2000, divided by the sum of the end-of-1999 book values of equity. This ratio is equal
to 8.55. Nasdaq's dividend yield, c =1 :35%, is the sum of the dividends of all Nasdaq
¯rms in 1999, divided by the sum of the end-of-1998 book values. We measure pro¯tability
as the accounting return on equity (ROE), following the de¯nition of ½i
t. Nasdaq's current
pro¯tability, ½N
t =9 :96% per year, is computed as the 1999Q4 annualized value of Nasdaq's
aggregate pro¯tability, i.e., the sum of 1999Q4 earnings across all Nasdaq ¯rms, divided by
the sum of the most recent pre-1999Q4 book values of equity. Analogously, ½t =1 8 :62% per
year is computed as the 1999Q4 annualized value of NYSE/Amex's aggregate pro¯tability.
It is not surprising that this value is higher than ½t's central tendency of 12.17%, because
the U.S. economy was near the peak of a ten-year expansion at the end of 1999.8
7Nasdaq's pro¯tability is computed in the same way as the NYSE/Amex pro¯tability in Section 3.
8The data are obtained from Compustat. Earnings are computed as income before extraordinary items
available for common, plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit. Book equity is stockholders' equity
plus deferred taxes and investment tax credit, minus the book value of preferred stock. See PV (2004) for
9We assume that the competition that wipes out the present value of Nasdaq's future
abnormal earnings can arrive in any instant with probability p =1 =20. As a result, the
expected time over which Nasdaq can earn abnormal pro¯ts (Ã
N
)i sE ( T)=1 =p =2 0y e a r s .
Later, we also review the results for E(T) = 15 and 25 years.
Panel A of Table 2 reports the model-implied M/B for Nasdaq on March 10, 2000 under
zero uncertainty about Ã
N
, for di®erent values of the equity premium and b ÃN.( R e c a l l
that b ÃN is Nasdaq's expected pro¯tability in excess of the NYSE/Amex pro¯tability.) The
model-implied M/B increases with b ÃN and decreases with the equity premium, as expected.
With b ÃN · 3% per year, not even the equity premium of 1% per year can match Nasdaq's
M/B of 8.55. With b ÃN = 4% per year, the premium needed to match Nasdaq's M/B is
about 1.4% per year, and with b ÃN = 5%, the required premium is about 2.8% per year.
Panel B of Table 2 reports the model-implied return volatility for Nasdaq on March 10,
2000 under zero uncertainty. This volatility ranges mostly between 20% and 30% per year.
For comparison, we compute Nasdaq's actual return volatility in March 2000 as the standard
deviation of the daily Nasdaq returns in that month, and obtain 41.49% per year.9 Since
this estimate is noisy, we also compute the average of the monthly volatilities in 2000, all
computed from daily returns within the month, and obtain 47.03% per year. Both 41.49%
and 47.03% are far above the model-implied volatility values in Panel B. Our model is clearly
unable to match Nasdaq's return volatility under the assumption of zero uncertainty.
Next, we recognize that Ã
N
is unknown. Table 3 is an equivalent of Table 2 under the
assumption that the standard deviation of the perceived distribution of Ã
N
is 3% per year.
The M/B ratios in Table 3 are higher than in Table 2, as expected from Proposition 2. For
example, with the equity premium of 3% and b ÃN = 3%, the model-implied M/B ratio is
7.41, whereas the corresponding ratio in Table 2 is only 4.87. The return volatilities are also
higher in Table 3: under the same parameters, the model-implied return volatility is 40.37%,
compared to 24.52% in Table 2. Acknowledging uncertainty about Ã
N
l e a d st ov a l u e so f
M/B and volatility that are closer to the values observed in the data.
The di®erences between the values in Tables 2 and 3 are the biggest for the lowest values
of the equity premium. For example, for b ÃN = 0 and the equity premium of 1%, M/B in
Table 3 is 1.41 times larger than M/B in Table 2, and the return volatility is 1.86 times
larger. Under the 8% equity premium, M/B in Table 3 is only 1.08 times larger, and the
further details. Throughout the paper, we eliminate the values of market equity and book equity below $1
million, as well as the values of ROE (earnings over book equity) above 1,000% in absolute value.
9The annualization is performed by multiplying the daily standard deviation by
p
252.
10volatility is only 1.20 times larger. When the equity premium is lower, future cash °ow is
discounted at a lower rate when valuing a ¯rm. As a result, a bigger fraction of the ¯rm's
value comes from earnings in the distant future, which are more a®ected by uncertainty
about Ã
N
than earnings in the near future, due to compounding. Therefore, uncertainty
about Ã
N
has the biggest e®ect on prices when the equity premium is low.
Panel A of Table 4 reports implied uncertainty, de¯ned as the uncertainty that equates
the model-implied M/B to the observed M/B.10 Implied uncertainty is listed as zero for all
pairs of b ÃN and the equity premium that deliver M/B ¸ 8:55 in Panel A. When b ÃN =0a n d
the equity premium is 3%, matching M/B of 8.55 requires the uncertainty of 5.06% per year.
Raising b ÃN to 3% per year, implied uncertainty drops to 3.38%. What values of implied
uncertainty are plausible? This question is the subject of the following subsection.
4.1.1. Plausible Values of Implied Uncertainty
To judge the plausibility of a given value of uncertainty, we need to ¯nd a measurable quantity
that is closely related to uncertainty. One natural candidate is return volatility, which is
strongly positively associated with uncertainty in the model. For any value of uncertainty,
we can compute the model-implied return volatility. The plausibility of a given value of
uncertainty can then be assessed by comparing the corresponding return volatility with the
volatility observed in the data. We judge uncertainty to be implausibly high if it produces
return volatility that is signi¯cantly higher than the observed volatility.
The model-implied return volatilities are reported in Panel B of Table 4. The implied
uncertainty of 3.38%, discussed above, produces return volatility of 46.66% per year. This
value is close to Nasdaq's observed volatility computed earlier (about 41.49% to 47.03%
per year). This result suggests that the implied uncertainty of 3.38%, obtained in the
combination of b ÃN = 3% and the equity premium of 3%, is plausible.
More generally, Table 4 identi¯es the pairs of values of the equity premium and b ÃN for
which implied uncertainty matches not only Nasdaq's M/B but also its return volatility. One
such pair is b ÃN = 2% and the equity premium of 2%, which leads to implied uncertainty
of 3.54%, which then produces return volatility of 47.54%. Another pair, discussed earlier,
10This calculation is similar in spirit to computing the implied volatility of an option. The idea of backing
out the prior uncertainty needed to match the observed evidence is not new. For example, in a mean-variance
framework where investors can invest in U.S. as well as non-U.S. stocks, P¶ astor (2000) computes the prior
uncertainty about mispricing that is necessary to explain the observed degree of home bias. Similarly, in a
regime-switching model for the drift rate of earnings, David and Veronesi (2002) use options data to back
out the implied uncertainty about the future earnings growth of the S&P 500 index.
11is b ÃN = 3% and the equity premium of 3%. Yet another pair is b ÃN =4 %a n dt h ee q u i t y
premium of 4%, which leads to implied uncertainty of 3.32% and return volatility of 47.81%.
All these combinations of the equity premium and b ÃN seem plausible, as discussed next.
4.1.2. Plausible Values of the Discount Rate
What are the plausible levels of the equity premium in March 2000? Several recent studies
argue that the equity premium was low at that time. According to Cochrane (2002), \The
top of the largest economic boom in postwar U.S. history is exactly when you'd expect a
risk premium to be low and stock prices to be high." Lettau, Ludvigson, and Wachter (2004)
argue that the equity premium declined signi¯cantly in the 1990s due to a decline in the
volatility of aggregate consumption. Fama and French (2002) estimate the equity premium
for 1951-2000 to be 2.6% and 4.3% per year, based on their dividend and earnings growth
models, but some of their premium estimates for 1991-2000 are as low as 0.32% per year.
Welch (2001) surveys 510 academics in 2001 and reports a median equity premium forecast
of 3%. P¶ astor and Stambaugh (2001) estimate the premium of 4.8% at the end of 1999.
Ilmanen (2003) estimates the premium of 2% in March 2000. Based on this evidence, we
regard the equity premium values between 1% and 5% per year as the most plausible.
Given its exposure to the SDF, Nasdaq commands a higher risk premium than the old
economy. In fact, Nasdaq's expected excess return in our model is more than twice the equity
premium. For example, when the equity premium is 3%, Nasdaq's expected excess return
equals 6.62% for b ÃN = 0, and 6.24% for b ÃN = 3%. Also note that the risk-free rate in Tables
2 through 4 is not speci¯ed exogenously. Both the risk-free rate and the equity premium
are driven by the same variable, yt, so by specifying the equity premium, we are implicitly
choosing the risk-free rate as well. The implied risk-free rates for Tables 2 through 4 look
reasonable. For example, the real rates corresponding to the equity premiums between 1%
and 6% are all between 4.79% (for the equity premium of 3%) and 6.32% per year (for the
premium of 6%). For comparison, on March 10, 2000, the annual nominal yields on Treasury
bonds with maturities between one and 20 years were between 6.21% and 6.55%. With 2%
to 3% in°ation11, the real rates in our model slightly exceed the observed real rates, which
induces a mild conservative bias in the valuation procedure.
11The GDP de°ator increased by 2.2% in 2000, and the core in°ation rate in 2000 was 2.6%. Both the
in°ation and interest data are obtained from the website of the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
124.1.3. Plausible Values of Expected Pro¯tability
To match Nasdaq's M/B and return volatility in Table 4, we need relatively small positive
values of b ÃN, such as 2% or 3% per year. The market indeed appears to have expected
higher average pro¯tability from Nasdaq ¯rms than from the NYSE/Amex ¯rms in March
2000. For example, consider equity analyst forecasts provided by I/B/E/S. For each ¯rm,
we compute the average forecast of long-term earnings growth by averaging forecasts across
all analysts covering the ¯rm in March 2000. The average of these average forecasts is
15.1% when computed across the NYSE/Amex ¯rms, but the same average computed across
Nasdaq ¯rms is substantially higher, at 28.8%. These numbers are not comparable with
b ÃN, but they suggest that b ÃN > 0 might be reasonable. There is also abundant anecdotal
evidence that cash °ow expectations for Nasdaq were relatively high at that time.12
One example of beliefs that justify Nasdaq's valuation in March 2000 is b ÃN =3 % ,t h e
equity premium of 3%, and E(T) = 20 years. To better understand these beliefs, we use
equation (2) to compute the distribution of Nasdaq's pro¯tability over the following 20 years.
As shown in Panel A of Figure 1, Nasdaq's pro¯tability is expected to improve over the ¯rst
three years, after which it is expected to decline slowly until time T. Twenty years ahead,
in year 2019, the 1st, 50th, and 99th percentiles of the predictive distribution for Nasdaq's
ROE (½i
t+20) are -3.07%, 14.56%, and 32.20% per year. The same percentiles for the average
ROE between 1999 and 2019 are 4.90%, 15.07%, and 25.25%, as shown in Panel B.
While an average ROE of 25.25% per year over a 20-year period has not been observed
in Nasdaq's short history, such a possibility cannot be dismissed. Certain sectors of the
economy have delivered high average pro¯tability for long periods of time. Suppose that,
in 1954, you formed the portfolio of all ¯rms in the pharmaceutical industry that had valid
book values in Compustat at the end of 1954. This portfolio earned the average ROE of
25.20% over the 45-year period between 1955 and 1999. A similarly constructed candy-and-
soda industry portfolio, formed in 1963, earned the average ROE of 24.34% over the 36-year
period between 1964 and 1999. Over the same 36-year period, the tobacco products industry
portfolio formed in 1963 earned the average ROE of 22.12%. We do not wish to push this
anecdotal evidence too far; after all, it is easier to observe high average ROE at the level of
an industry than at the level of an index that includes ¯rms from many di®erent industries.
The purpose of our examples is only to illustrate the fact that sustained high pro¯tability is
12E.g., \Applegate: This business cycle is extraordinary... Today tech earnings are growing 24%, which is
signi¯cantly better than the rest of the market. Their prices are accordingly richer... I'm comfortable right
here, sticking with the Ciscos, Microsofts and Intels." David Henry, USA Today, December 16, 1999.
13possible, even at the sectoral level.13
Another reason to be optimistic about Nasdaq's future pro¯tability is the increasing
importance of intangible assets in the economy. Intangible assets are often not included
in the book value of the ¯rm, but they do contribute to the ¯rm's earnings. As a result,
intangible assets increase the earnings-to-book ratio, or ROE. Assuming a continued trend
towards a knowledge-based economy, the average ROE should be permanently higher than
before, especially for ¯rms with a lot of intangible capital. To the extent that Nasdaq ¯rms
have more intangible capital than NYSE/Amex ¯rms, b ÃN > 0 seems reasonable.
In Table 4, Nasdaq is expected to earn abnormal pro¯ts over 20 years after March 2000.
Table 5 is an equivalent of Table 4 with E(T)=1 5a n d2 5y e a r s . W i t hE ( T) = 15,
matching Nasdaq's M/B requires more optimism (i.e., higher b ÃN)t h a nw i t hE ( T) = 20. For
example, with a 3% equity premium, we need b ÃN = 5% to match Nasdaq's M/B and also
obtain return volatility (41.76%) that corresponds to the values estimated from the data. In
contrast, matching Nasdaq's M/B is easier with E(T) = 25. With a 3% equity premium, we
need b ÃN of only about 2% to match both M/B and return volatility.
To summarize, Nasdaq's valuation on March 10, 2000 is consistent with reasonable values
of the equity premium, expected pro¯tability, and uncertainty about average pro¯tability.
4.2. Matching the Valuations of Individual Firms
In this subsection, we use the model to value 12 high-pro¯le technology ¯rms: Akamai,
Amazon, Ciena, Cisco, Dell, Ebay, Immunex, Intel, Microsoft, Priceline, Red Hat, and
Yahoo. The parameters for the process governing pro¯tability ½i
t in equation (2) are chosen
to match the median Nasdaq ¯rm in the data. For each year and each ¯rm, we compute
the ¯rm's pro¯tability (ROE) as the ratio of the ¯rm's current-year earnings and its book
value of equity at the end of the previous year. For each ¯rm, we construct the longest
uninterrupted time series of valid ROEs. If this series is at least 10 years long, we estimate
an AR(1) model for ROE. The slope coe±cients are adjusted for the small-sample bias (e.g.,
Stambaugh, 1999). The median value of Ái across all Nasdaq ¯rms satisfying 0 <Á i < 1
is 0.3891. The median residual volatility of ROE is 10.46% per year. We decompose this
13We de¯ne industries based on the 48-industry classi¯cation scheme from Ken French's website. A
portfolio's ROE in a given year is computed as the sum of earnings in that year divided by the sum of
book values at the end of the previous year, where both sums are computed across all ¯rms in the original
portfolio. That is, the industry portfolios are not rebalanced to include new ¯rms in the industry.
14volatility into ¾i;0 =6 :65% and ¾i;i =8 :07% per year, which implies a M/B ratio of 1.7 for
a ¯rm with zero uncertainty, zero Ã
i
,a n d½i
t = ½t = ½L.
Each ¯rm's M/B ratio is computed by dividing the March 10, 2000 market value of
equity by the end-of-1999 book value of equity. Firm pro¯tability, ½i
t,i sc o m p u t e da st h e
1999 earnings divided by the end-of-1998 book equity. If the end-of-1998 book value is not
available on Compustat, we replace it by the end-of-1999 book value.14 The dividend yield,
ci, is computed as the 1999 dividends divided by the end-of-1998 book equity. Only one ¯rm
in our set, Intel, paid dividends in 1999.
Table 6 reports the implied uncertainty and the associated return volatility on March 10,
2000 for all 12 ¯rms. Throughout the table, the expected horizon is 15 years, E(T) = 15. If
we used the same horizon as for Nasdaq, E(T) = 20, the ¯rms' valuations would be easier to
match. However, it seems reasonable to assume a shorter horizon for individual ¯rms than
for Nasdaq. Recall that E(T) re°ects the market's expectation of the time when the present
value of future abnormal earnings is eliminated by the arrival of competition. For any given
¯rm, competition can arrive in the form of a single ¯rm that develops a superior product.
In contrast, competition that wipes out the future abnormal earnings of Nasdaq as a whole
is likely to arrive in the form of new technology that the Nasdaq incumbents will fail to
implement (e.g., Hobijn and Jovanovic, 2001). Such competition is likely to arrive later for
the index as a whole than for any given ¯rm.15
To simplify the description of our results, we assume the equity premium of 3% per year.
However, Table 6 reports the results for all values of the equity premium between 1% and 6%.
Naturally, the lower the equity premium, the easier it is for our model to match the observed
M/B ratios. Importantly, our results are not overly sensitive to the equity premium, and the
discussion below would be very similar under the equity premium of 2% or 4%.
First, we consider some of the biggest technology ¯rms: Microsoft (market capitalization
$516bn on March 10, 2000), Cisco ($456bn), Intel ($395bn), and Dell ($130bn). The M/B
ratios of these ¯rms were high on March 10, 2000: 18.79 for Microsoft, 39.02 for Cisco, 11.09
for Intel, and 24.47 for Dell. All of these M/B ratios can be matched with reasonable levels
of uncertainty about Ã
i
. As before, we judge the plausibility of a given value of implied
14This is the case for Akamai, Priceline, and Red Hat. While Amazon's book value at the end of 1998 is
available, this value °uctuates rapidly over the following few quarters; in fact, it turns negative in 2000Q2.
Since earnings are computed over the course of the whole year 1999, we use book equity halfway through
1999 (i.e., the end-of-1999Q2 value) to compute Amazon's pro¯tability in 1999.
15Our choice of a 15-year expected horizon seems fairly conservative. Schwartz and Moon (2000) use a
25-year horizon when valuing Amazon. Ofek and Richardson (2002) consider horizons of 10 to 30 years.
15uncertainty by comparing the model-implied return volatility with the observed volatility.
Consider b Ãi = 0. The implied uncertainty for Microsoft is 3.84%, which implies return
volatility of 59.44%. This value is close to Microsoft's actual volatility, which is estimated
to be (57.44%, 56.10%), where the ¯rst value is based on the March 2000 returns and the
second value is based on all returns in 2000, as before. Intel's implied uncertainty is 4.86%,
which yields return volatility of 69.90%, which is close to Intel's actual volatility of (45.81%,
68.71%). Dell's implied uncertainty is 3.85%, which leads to return volatility of 59.71%,
which is close to Dell's actual volatility of (51.75%, 69.50%). In other words, under the
assumption that the average future pro¯tabilities of Microsoft, Intel, and Dell are equal to
the pro¯tability of the old economy, the implied uncertainty in our model matches not only
the ¯rms' observed M/B ratios but approximately also their return volatilities.
Among our four biggest ¯rms, only Cisco has an M/B and volatility that cannot be
matched with b Ãi = 0. However, Cisco's implied uncertainty under b Ãi = 4% is 3.33%,
which implies return volatility (59.90%) that is close to Cisco's estimated volatility of
(51.75%,69.50%). Assuming that Cisco can deliver average pro¯tability of 4% in excess of
the old economy's pro¯tability over the expected horizon of 15 years strikes us as plausible.16
The assumption of b Ãi = 4% can also rationalize Yahoo's M/B of 78.41. Yahoo's implied
uncertainty of 4.40% implies return volatility of 81.78%, which is close to Yahoo's observed
volatility of (75.41%, 90.61%). Compared to Cisco, Yahoo has a higher implied uncertainty,
which seems reasonable because its M/B and return volatility are both higher than Cisco's.
Next, consider the M/B ratios of Ebay (27.87), Red Hat (26.50), and Immunex (105.70).
One might expect that matching these high M/Bs requires large values of b Ãi, but that is not
the case; in fact, the value that works best for all three ¯rms is b Ãi = ¡2%. This surprising
¯nding is due to the fact that all three ¯rms have highly volatile returns. Under b Ãi = ¡2%,
the ¯rms' implied uncertainties are 5.83%, 6.35%, and 6.04%, respectively, and the model-
implied return volatilities are close to the observed volatilities of (129.24%, 113.64%) for
Ebay, (121.00%, 122.33%) for Red Hat, and (155.94%, 117.71%) for Immunex. For these
¯rms' stock returns to be so volatile, uncertainty about the ¯rms' growth rates must be so
large that the expected growth rates can be below the growth rate of the old economy.
The ¯rms whose M/Bs are the most di±cult to match are Amazon (88.07) and Priceline
(39.58). This di±culty stems from the ¯rms' extremely poor pro¯tability: Amazon's 1999
16For comparison, the average of all of Cisco's valid ROEs at the time (1992 to 1999) was 47.13%, signi¯-
cantly higher than the old economy's average ROE of 13.03% over the same period.
16ROE is -126%, and Priceline's ROE is -264%. Investors holding Amazon and Priceline must
have expected these ¯rms to become highly pro¯table in the future. If investors expected
b Ãi = 4%, which works well for Yahoo and Cisco, the implied uncertainties for Amazon and
Priceline would be implausibly large: they would imply return volatilities of 147.12% for
Amazon and 191.66% for Priceline, but the actual return volatilities are smaller: (71.67%,
103.33%) for Amazon, and (128.17%, 133.65%) for Priceline. Matching the observed volatil-
ities (as well as M/B) requires b Ãi of about 10% for both Amazon and Priceline.
If b Ãi = 10% seems large, note that in the absence of uncertainty about Ã
i
,j u s t i f y i n g
Amazon's M/B ratio would require Ã
i
> 16%, and justifying Priceline's M/B would require
Ã
i
> 20%. Moreover, the implied return volatilities for both ¯rms would be counterfactually
low. Uncertainty about Ã
i
helps us understand these ¯rms' high valuations and volatilities.
To assess the plausibility of the beliefs that justify Amazon's valuation in March 2000
(b Ãi = 10% and 3% equity premium), we use equation (2) to compute the distribution of
Amazon's future pro¯tability, ½i
t+¿, over the next 15 years. As shown in Panel A of Figure 2,
Amazon's pro¯tability is expected to improve sharply, but it is expected to remain negative
for about four years. Median pro¯tability turns positive in 2004, and it reaches 20.30% in
2014.17 Five years ahead (in 2004), the 1st and 99th percentiles of the predictive distribution
for Amazon's ROE are -27.34% and 32.44%. In 2014, the same percentiles are -10.11% and
50.71%. These quantities are well within the range of the ROEs observed in the data.
Panel B of Figure 2 plots the model-predicted distribution of Amazon's future book value
as a fraction of the 1999 book value. Due to the large current losses, the median forecast of
Amazon's book value is below its 1999 value even after 15 years. But M/B depends on the
expectation of the future book value, not its median. This expectation exceeds the median,
as shown in Figure 2, because the distribution of the future book value is right-skewed. For
example, in 2014, the 10th and 90th percentiles of the distribution of Bi
t+15=Bi
t are 0.16 and
2.76, and the 1st and 99th percentiles are 0.05 and 8.75. The logic behind Amazon's high
M/B ratio in March 2000 then seems clear. High uncertainty about Amazon's future growth
rate leads to a right-skewed distribution of Amazon's future book value, which in turn leads
to a high expected book value, which then gives Amazon a high M/B ratio.
Figure 3 illustrates the same logic on the example of Yahoo. The distribution of Yahoo's
ROE in 2014 has a median of 15.66%, with the 1st and 99th percentiles of -13.44% and
44.77%. Yahoo's book value is expected to grow more quickly than Amazon's, because
17In reality, Amazon's earnings turned positive in 2003Q3. Amazon's ¯rst pro¯table year was 2003. Its
stock price at the time of this writing (April 2004) is about the same as its stock price in April 2000.
17Yahoo's 1999 ROE (10.52%) is higher than Amazon's. In 2014, the 10th and 90th percentiles
of the distribution of Yahoo's Bi
t+15=Bi
t are 2.73 and 45.79, and the 1st and 99th percentiles
are 0.87 and 144.46. As a result of this large skewness, Yahoo's expected book value in 2014
is more than 20 times its 1999 book value, which implies a large current M/B ratio.
Is this growth rate in Yahoo's book value realistic? Recall that book value grows at the
rate equal to pro¯tability, assuming no dividends and no issues or withdrawals of equity, so
the average growth rate of book equals average pro¯tability. Yahoo's average pro¯tability
over the next 15 years (2000-2014) has a distribution whose 1st, 50th, and 99th percentiles are
-0.97%, 16.11%, and 33.18%. This distribution seems plausible. While the 99th percentile
of 33.18% is large, it is far from unprecedented. Consider all 2,969 ¯rms whose longest
continuous series of valid annual ROEs between 1950 and 2002 are at least 15 years long. In
this universe, there are 35 ¯rms (1.2% of the total) whose average ROE over the previous
15 or more years exceeds 33.18%.18 Microsoft's and Oracle's average annual ROEs between
1988 (¯rst year available) and 1999 are 44.46% and 47.19%, respectively.
Given our assumptions, we can infer the probability that the market assigned at the
end of 1999 to the event that \Yahoo will become the next Microsoft." Speci¯cally, we can
compute the probability that Yahoo's average ROE over the 12 years after 1999 will exceed
Microsoft's average ROE of 44.46% over the previous 12 years. This probability is 0.0066, or
one in 152, which does not strike us as implausibly large. Yahoo's valuation in March 2000
seems consistent with plausibly high uncertainty about average excess pro¯tability.
We make some strong simplifying assumptions in this section. For example, we assume
that all ¯rms face an expected horizon of 15 years over which abnormal pro¯ts can be earned,
but ¯rms operating in industries with di®erent barriers to entry are likely to face di®erent
horizons. We also assume that the parameters governing the mean reversion and volatility
of the ¯rm's ROE (Ái, ¾i;0,a n d¾i;i) are equal across ¯rms, but these parameters can vary
across ¯rms and industries. All these assumptions are made for simplicity, and they can be
relaxed if this model is to be applied in practice.
The reported earnings extracted from Compustat are not adjusted for employee stock
option expense. If stock options were expensed, the reported earnings of the S&P 500 ¯rms
would be reduced by about 8% in 1999, and by almost 10% in 2000 (The Wall Street Journal,
18These numbers should be viewed as merely illustrative, since they are subject to an obvious survival
bias. Also, the cross-sectional standard deviation of average ROE in this universe of ¯rms is 11.28%, which
exceeds all values of implied uncertainty in Table 6. Since the cross-sectional dispersion can serve as a
standard deviation of economically noninformative prior beliefs about average ROE, it should exceed the
market's uncertainty about any given ¯rm's average ROE. It is comforting to see that it does.
18July 16, 2002). Botosan and Plumlee (2001) report median reductions between 9.8% and
14% in 1996-1999 based on the sample of 100 fastest-growing ¯rms in the U.S., as identi¯ed
by Fortune magazine in September 1999. As a simple though imperfect robustness check,
we repeat the analysis in this section with all Nasdaq earnings reduced by a seventh. While
implied uncertainty increases for given values of b Ãi and the equity premium, the parameter
values required to match the observed valuations and volatilities remain reasonable.
5. The Time Series of Implied Uncertainty
In Section 4., we use our model to match the M/B ratios of Nasdaq ¯rms on March 10,
2000. In this section, we match the whole time series of the aggregate M/B ratios in the
new and old economy. The time series of both M/B ratios are plotted in Figure 4. The
new economy's M/B is the ratio of the sums of the market values and the most recent book
values of equity across all Nasdaq ¯rms. The old economy's M/B is computed analogously
for the NYSE/Amex ¯rms. The M/B of the new economy rises and falls dramatically around
year 2000, but the M/B of the old economy exhibits a substantially less pronounced pattern.
Based on this ¯gure, we concur with Cochrane (2002), who observes that \if there was a
`bubble,' it was concentrated in Nasdaq stocks."
The purpose of this section is to analyze the time series of the implied uncertainty about
Nasdaq's average excess pro¯tability. This time series is obtained in two steps. First, we
extract the time series of the equity premium from the observed M/B and pro¯tability of
the old economy. Second, we compute the uncertainty that equates the observed M/B of
the new economy to its model-implied value, given the new economy's observed pro¯tability
and the equity premium computed in the ¯rst step.
In the ¯rst step, we compute the time series of yt, which is the key determinant of the
equity premium, by inverting the pricing formula in equation (16). In this formula, the M/B
ratio of the old economy is a function of yt and ½t,s oyt can be computed conditional on
M/B and ½t. The time series of ½t, whose construction is described in Section 3., is plotted in
Figure 5, along with the realized pro¯tability of the Nasdaq index. The old economy's ROE
was relatively high in the 1990s, around 15% per year, but it fell to about 10% after year
2000. The new economy's ROE experienced a substantially larger fall, from about 10% in
the 1990s to about -20% per year in 2001.19 Expectations of this dramatic fall in pro¯tability
must have contributed to the declines in the Nasdaq index in 2000 and 2001.
19Several large Nasdaq ¯rms reported unprecedented losses in 2001. For example, JDS Uniphase lost over
$50bn, mostly as a result of write-o®s from bad acquisitions.
19Figure 6 plots the time series of the implied equity premium. The pattern of variation
in the equity premium seems reasonable. The premium increases from about 5% to about
7.5% per year in the mid-1970s, and then it gradually declines into the late 1990s: to about
5% at the end of 1994, 4% at the end of 1996, and 1% at the end of 1998. The premium
then rises to 1.8% at the end of 1999, 2.4% at the end of 2000, and 3.2% at the end of 2002.
In the second step, we rely on Proposition 2 to relate Nasdaq's M/B to uncertainty about
Ã
N
,a sw e l la st oyt, the old-economy pro¯tability ½t, the new-economy pro¯tability ½N
t ,a n d
the new-economy expected excess pro¯tability b ÃN.F o rag i v e nv a l u eo fb ÃN,w ei n v e r tt h e
formula (15) for every t to obtain the time series of implied uncertainty fb ¾N;tg.
The outcome of this procedure must be interpreted with caution. Given the deterministic
process for Ã
N
in equation (5), b ¾N;t in our model can only go down as more information
becomes available, but b ¾N;t inferred from the observed prices may well increase over time.
This dynamic inconsistency has an analogy in option valuation, where it is customary to
invert the Black-Scholes pricing formula at various points in time to obtain the time series
of implied volatility. This time series is generally considered informative about time-varying
volatility, even though it is inconsistent with the constant volatility assumption of the Black-
Scholes model. The Black-Scholes model can be extended to remove this inconsistency,
but only at the cost of added complexity. Similarly, our model can be extended to allow
for increases in b ¾N;t by adding random shocks to Ã
N
, and by allowing investors to learn
about Ã
N
from signals with time-varying precision. We have examined such a (signi¯cantly
more complicated) extension, and found that random °uctuation in Ã
N
increases prices,
for the same reason that uncertainty about Ã
N
increases prices. Therefore, our simplifying
assumption of a deterministic Ã
N
c a nb ev i e w e da sc o n s e r v a t i v ei nt h a ti tm a k e si tm o r e
di±cult for our model to match the observed prices.
Panel A of Figure 7 plots the time series of implied uncertainty, b ¾N;t, computed under
three di®erent assumptions about b ÃN.F o rb ÃN = 2%, implied uncertainty is zero until 1980,
it then rises to about 3% per year in the early 1980s, and then it falls back to zero. The
uncertainty rises in the second half of the 1990s, to about 3% at the ends of 1999 and 2000,
and then to about 4% at the end of 2001, before falling in 2002. This pattern underlines the
message of this paper. We argue that the runup in technology stock prices in the late 1990s
was partly due to an increase in uncertainty about average pro¯tability.
We also examine the time variation in return volatility implied by this variation in un-
certainty. In the model, the new economy's volatility is positively related to uncertainty, but
the old economy's volatility is not. Therefore, increases in uncertainty should increase the
20di®erence between the model-implied return volatilities in the new and old economies. We
compute the year-end time series of this di®erence, and plot it in Panel B of Figure 7. The
di®erence is high in the early 1980s, but it is especially high in the late 1990s: it ranges from
about 20% to about 50% between 1999 and 2001, across three di®erent values of b ÃN.
Interestingly, while Nasdaq's implied uncertainty in Panel A of Figure 7 is only slightly
higher in the late 1990s than in the early 1980s, the di®erence between the return volatilities
in Panel B is substantially higher in the late 1990s. The reason is that the equity premium
in the late 1990s is substantially lower than in the early 1980s (Figure 6). Uncertainty has
the biggest e®ect on prices when the equity premium is low, as argued earlier.
How does the model-implied pattern in Panel B of Figure 7 compare with the data?
Panel A of Figure 8 plots the time series of the realized return volatilities of the Nasdaq and
NYSE/Amex indexes. Each month, return volatility is computed as the standard deviation
of the daily index returns in that month. To plot smoother annual series, we average the
monthly values within each year. The Nasdaq volatility increases gradually from 12% per
year in 1994 to its peak of 47% in 2000, before it declines to 34% in 2002. The NYSE/Amex
volatility increases from 9% per year in 1994 to 18% in 2000, and to 21% in 2002.
Panel B of Figure 8 plots the di®erence between the Nasdaq and NYSE/Amex return
volatilities. This di®erence rises from 3% per year in 1994 to almost 30% in 2000, after which
it falls to 13% in 2002. This pattern is similar to the model-implied pattern in the 1990s in
Panel B of Figure 7. This empirical evidence is consistent with an increase in uncertainty
about ÃN in the late 1990s, followed by a decline in 2002.
Note that the patterns in Panels B of Figures 7 and 8 are similar mainly in the 1990s.
Before 1990, Nasdaq volatility is smaller than the NYSE/Amex volatility, although it should
always be bigger according to the model. Moreover, the di®erence in the observed volatilities
before 1990 is almost °at, whereas the model predicts a mild increase in the early 1980s.
One likely reason behind these discrepancies is that our designation of Nasdaq as the new
economy is less appropriate before 1990. Some of the best known technology ¯rms before
the 1990s, such as IBM, have always traded on the NYSE rather than on Nasdaq.
In addition to return volatility, we also analyze cash °ow volatility. Uncertainty about
average future ROE is likely to be high when the cross-sectional variance of ROE is high. By
variance decomposition, this variance is the sum of the cross-sectional variance of expected
ROE and the cross-sectional expectation of the variance of ROE, both of which make the
average future ROE less certain. We compute the cross-sectional standard deviation of ROE
21for Nasdaq stocks, as well as for NYSE/Amex stocks. Figure 9 shows that the dispersion in
the Nasdaq ROEs increases dramatically relative to the dispersion in the NYSE/Amex ROEs
in the late 1990s. The di®erence between the two dispersions is unusually high between 1995
and 2000, after which it declines sharply. This pattern is consistent with an increase in
uncertainty in the late 1990s, followed by a decline.
To summarize, we ¯nd that the volatilities of Nasdaq returns and pro¯ts increased sharply
at the end of the past decade, both in absolute terms and relative to NYSE/Amex. This
evidence supports our premise that the uncertainty about the average pro¯tability of Nasdaq
¯rms was unusually high in the late 1990s. The e®ect of this uncertainty on stock prices was
further ampli¯ed by a relatively low equity premium at that time.
6. The Cross Section of Implied Uncertainty
We argue that Nasdaq valuations in the late 1990s were high partly due to high uncertainty
about average pro¯tability. Under this argument, stocks with the highest uncertainty should
have not only some of the highest M/B ratios, but also some of the highest return volatilities.
Anecdotal evidence consistent with this argument is provided in Section 4. In this section,
we examine the whole cross-section of Nasdaq ¯rms, and we document a strong positive
relation between implied uncertainty (computed from M/B) and return volatility.
We compute implied uncertainty on March 10, 2000 for all 2,691 Nasdaq ¯rms with valid
M/B and ROE data at the end of 1999. For each ¯rm, we choose b Ãi =0 ,E ( T)=1 5
years, and c =1 :35% (Nasdaq's dividend yield in 1999), for simplicity. The variables yt
and ½t are the end-of-1999 values computed in Section 5. We ¯nd substantial di®erences in
implied uncertainty across ¯rms. For 66.6% of ¯rms, implied uncertainty is zero (i.e., the
model-implied M/B matches or exceeds the actual M/B under zero uncertainty). The 90th
percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of implied uncertainty is 5.79%, and the 99th
percentile is 9.03% per year.20 The highest implied uncertainty is observed in the Internet,
biotechnology, and telecommunications sectors.
According to the model, stocks with high implied uncertainty should have highly volatile
returns. Speci¯cally, the model predicts a linear positive relation between squared implied
uncertainty and idiosyncratic return volatility.21 We compute idiosyncratic volatility for a
20In the subsequent analysis, we winsorize the top 1% of observations of implied uncertainty, i.e, we set
their values equal to the 99th percentile of the cross-sectional distribution of implied uncertainty.
21We do not provide explicit formulas for return volatility, to save space. Such formulas are provided in
22given stock in a given month as the residual volatility from the regression of the stock's daily
returns within the month on the contemporaneous and lagged market returns.22 Idiosyncratic
volatility in a given year is computed as the average of the 12 monthly volatilities.
The model's prediction is strongly supported by the data. The cross-sectional correlation
between squared implied uncertainty on March 10, 2000 and idiosyncratic return volatility
in 2000 is 53%. When the year-2000 value of idiosyncratic volatility is replaced by the
noisier March 2000 value, the correlation remains high, at 38%. To assess the signi¯cance of
the correlation, we regress squared implied uncertainty on March 10, 2000 on idiosyncratic
volatility in 2000. Since many observations of implied uncertainty are censored at zero,
we estimate a censored regression model, by using the maximum likelihood procedure. The
estimated slope coe±cient implies that a 10% per year di®erence in return volatility translates
into the di®erence of 5.6 in squared implied uncertainty, which is the di®erence between the
implied uncertainties of zero and 2.37% per year, or between 5% and 5.53%. The asymptotic
t-statistic for the slope coe±cient is 19.69, which indicates a highly signi¯cant relation,
assuming that the residuals are cross-sectionally independent.
To provide additional evidence on the relation between implied uncertainty and return
volatility, we compute implied uncertainty and idiosyncratic volatility for all Nasdaq ¯rms
at the end of each year between 1973 and 2002, and we run the same censored cross-sectional
regression at each year-end. The slope coe±cient is positive in every single year, and the
t-statistic computed from the time series of the 30 estimated coe±cients is equal to 4.79.23
Figure 10 plots the year-end time series of the estimated cross-sectional correlation be-
tween squared implied uncertainty and idiosyncratic return volatility. The correlation com-
puted on March 10, 2000 is also shown. The correlation varies from the low of 4% at the end
of 1990 to the high of 53% on March 10, 2000, and the time-series average of the year-end
values is 25%. High correlations are observed not only in the late 1990s, but also in the early
1980s. The early 1980s witnessed a high-technology boom that has been characterized as a
\biotech revolution" (Malkiel, 1999), so it seems plausible for uncertainty to play a role in
that period. Note that Panel A of Figure 7 indicates high implied uncertainty in the early
1980s, without using any information about return volatility.
PV (2003, 2004) in similar settings, with the same prediction.
22The regression is run only if at least 10 valid returns are available in the given month. Market returns
lagged by one and two days are included in the regression to mitigate potential concerns about nonsyn-
chronous trading. Note that the exact de¯nition of idiosyncratic volatility does not appear crucial because
all results in this section are highly signi¯cant also when residual variance is replaced by total variance.
23See Fama and MacBeth (1973). The t-statistic is adjusted for any signi¯cant serial correlation in the
time series of the estimated coe±cients. The t-statistic that assumes serial independence is equal to 8.14.
23The above discussion focuses on the univariate relation between implied uncertainty and
return volatility, but this relation survives controls for various ¯rm characteristics, such as
market capitalization and the dividend yield. PV (2003) report a signi¯cant positive cross-
sectional relation between M/B (the key determinant of implied uncertainty) and idiosyn-
cratic return volatility, after controlling for a larger set of ¯rm characteristics. To summarize,
we ¯nd that implied uncertainty is positively cross-sectionally related to idiosyncratic return
volatility, as predicted by the model.
7. Conclusions
Some academics and practitioners hold it to be self-evident that Nasdaq stocks were overval-
ued in the late 1990s. We argue that the Nasdaq valuations were not necessarily irrational ex
ante because uncertainty about average future pro¯tability, which increases the fundamental
values, was unusually high in the late 1990s. We calibrate a stock valuation model that
explicitly incorporates such uncertainty, and show that the Nasdaq valuations observed at
the peak of the \bubble" can be rationalized by high but plausible levels of this uncertainty.
The high uncertainty seems plausible because it matches not only the high level but also the
high volatility of Nasdaq stock prices at that time. Stocks with the highest M/B ratios in
the late 1990s also had some of the highest return volatilities, which is consistent with our
premise that these stocks had the most uncertain average future growth rates.
The Nasdaq \bubble" was accompanied not only by high return volatility, but also by
a high volume of trading. The trading volume for Internet stocks, for example, was three
times higher on average than for other stocks (Ofek and Richardson, 2003). The high trading
volume is broadly consistent with high uncertainty about the average pro¯tability of tech-
nology ¯rms. There is no trading in our single-agent model, but consider an extension in
which agents observe di®erent signals about average future pro¯tability. In this extension,
agents will trade because di®erent signals imply di®erent perceptions of the fundamental
value. Moreover, the amount of trading is likely to increase with uncertainty about average
pro¯tability. When uncertainty is high, signals are drawn from a wider distribution, which
implies perceptions of value that are more disperse across agents, and hence more trading.
This model of heterogeneous beliefs can be explored in future work.
Why did the \bubble" burst? Nasdaq's expected excess pro¯tability, ^ ÃN,m u s th a v eb e e n
revised downward when Nasdaq's pro¯tability plummetted in 2000 and 2001. This revision
is likely to have been substantial, given the high uncertainty at that time. For example,
24consider the parameters ^ ÃN = 3%, the equity premium of 3%, and the uncertainty of 3.38%,
which match Nasdaq's M/B and volatility in Table 4. Under these parameters, the observed
decline in Nasdaq's pro¯tability from 9% in 1999 to -3% in 2000 implies a revision in the
value of ^ ÃN from 3% at the end of 1999 to 0.9% at the end of 2000. Given this revision, the
model implies that Nasdaq's M/B ratio of 6.9 at the end of 1999 should fall to 3.4 at the
end of 2000, holding other variables equal. In reality, Nasdaq's M/B ratio fell to 3.5 (see
Figure 4), not far from the model's prediction. While this back-of-the-envelope calculation is
only illustrative, it suggests that the downward revision in Nasdaq's expected pro¯ts might
account for most of the dramatic decline in Nasdaq's M/B ratio in 2000.
The e®ect of uncertainty on stock prices is especially strong when the equity premium
is low. For example, our analysis suggests that uncertainty was high not only in the late
1990s but also during the biotech boom in the early 1980s. The M/B ratios were higher in
the 1990s because the equity premium declined between the early 1980s and the late 1990s,
according to our model. A decline in the equity premium boosts prices in two ways: by
reducing the discount rate, and by amplifying the positive e®ect of uncertainty on prices.
A decline in the equity premium also strengthens the impact of uncertainty on idiosyn-
cratic return volatility. As a result, holding uncertainty constant, idiosyncratic volatility
increases in our model when the equity premium declines. Therefore, the gradual increase
in average idiosyncratic return volatility, documented by Campbell et al. (2001), might to
some extent be due to the apparent gradual decline in the equity premium over the past few
decades. This conjecture can be further examined in future work.
Future research can also test our model against alternatives that involve behavioral biases.
To allow a fair horserace, it would be useful to develop a behavioral model that can be
calibrated to match the observed prices and volatilities of Nasdaq ¯rms in the late 1990s, as
our model does. Until our model is rejected in favor of such an alternative, the existence of
a Nasdaq \bubble" in the late 1990s should not be taken for granted.

































































Figure 1. Model-predicted distributions of future pro¯tability and average future pro¯tability
for Nasdaq. Panel A plots the selected percentiles of the model-predicted distribution of Nasdaq's future
pro¯tability (measured as return on equity, ROE). Panel B plots the selected percentiles of the distribution
of Nasdaq's average future pro¯tability, computed by averaging the ROE values between 1999 and the year
given on the horizontal axis. In both panels, the market's expectation of Nasdaq's average excess pro¯tability
is 3% per year, the associated uncertainty is 3.38%, the equity premium is 3% per year, and the expected
horizon is 20 years. Under these assumptions, the model-implied M/B ratio and return volatility correspond
to Nasdaq's actual M/B ratio and return volatility observed on March 10, 2000.
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Figure 2. Model-predicted distributions of future pro¯tability and book value for Amazon.
Panel A plots the selected percentiles of the model-predicted distribution of Amazon's future pro¯tability
(measured as return on equity, ROE). Panel B plots Amazon's expected future book value, along with the
selected percentiles of the book value's model-predicted distribution. The future book values are normalized
by the 1999 book value. In both panels, the market's expectation of Amazon's average excess pro¯tability
is 10% per year, the associated uncertainty is 4.51%, the equity premium is 3% per year, and the expected
horizon is 15 years. Under these assumptions, the model-implied M/B ratio and return volatility correspond
to Amazon's actual M/B ratio and return volatility observed on March 10, 2000.
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Figure 3. Model-predicted distributions of future pro¯tability and book value for Yahoo. Panel
A plots the selected percentiles of the model-predicted distribution of Yahoo's future pro¯tability (measured
as return on equity, ROE). Panel B plots Yahoo's expected future book value, along with the selected
percentiles of the book value's model-predicted distribution. The future book values are normalized by the
1999 book value. In both panels, the market's expectation of Yahoo's average excess pro¯tability is 4% per
year, the associated uncertainty is 4.40%, the equity premium is 3% per year, and the expected horizon is 15
years. Under these assumptions, the model-implied M/B ratio and return volatility correspond to Yahoo's
actual M/B ratio and return volatility observed on March 10, 2000.













Nasdaq   
Figure 4. M/B ratios. This ¯gure plots the annual time series of the market-to-book ratios (M/B) of the
Nasdaq index and the combined NYSE/Amex index. The M/B ratio of each index is computed as the sum
of the market values of equity across ¯rms in the index at the end of the current year, divided by the sum
of the book values of equity at the end of the previous year.













































Nasdaq   
Figure 5. Realized pro¯tability. This ¯gure plots the annual time series of the real realized pro¯tability
(return on equity, ROE) of the Nasdaq index and the combined NYSE/Amex index. The ROE of each index
is computed as the sum of current-year earnings across ¯rms in the index, divided by the sum of the book
values of equity at the end of the previous year.










































Figure 6. Implied equity premium. This ¯gure plots the annual time series of the equity premium that
sets the actual M/B ratio of the NYSE/Amex index at the end of the current year equal to its model-implied
value.























































Figure 7. Implied uncertainty. Panel A plots the time series of the implied uncertainty that sets the
actual M/B ratio of the Nasdaq index at the end of the current year equal to its model-implied value.
Implied uncertainty is plotted for three di®erent values of expected excess pro¯tability. Panel B plots the
model-implied di®erence between the return volatilities of the new and old economies.























Panel A. Return volatility
NYSE/Amex
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Panel B. Difference between return volatilities of Nasdaq and NYSE/Amex
Figure 8. Return volatility. Panel A plots the time series of the return volatility of the Nasdaq index
and the NYSE/Amex index. The return volatility in each month is computed as the standard deviation of
the daily index returns within the month. The annual volatility values are then computed by averaging the
monthly values within the year. Panel B plots the di®erences between the return volatilities of the Nasdaq
and NYSE/Amex indices.








Panel A. Cross−sectional std dev of ROE
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Panel B. Cross−sectional std dev of ROE: Nasdaq Minus NYSE/Amex
Figure 9. Cross-sectional standard deviation of pro¯tability. Panel A plots the cross-sectional
standard deviation of pro¯tability for Nasdaq ¯rms and for NYSE/Amex ¯rms. Pro¯tability (return on
equity, ROE) of each ¯rm in each year is computed as the ¯rm's earnings in the given year divided by the
¯rm's book equity at the end of the previous year. ROEs larger than 1,000% per year in absolute value
are excluded. Panel B plots the di®erence between the cross-sectional standard deviations of Nasdaq and
NYSE/Amex.




















Figure 10. Cross-sectional correlation between implied uncertainty and idiosyncratic return
volatility. The ¯gure plots the time series of the correlation between squared implied uncertainty and
idiosyncratic return volatility. The correlation values are computed at each year-end, as well as on March
10, 2000, across all Nasdaq ¯rms with valid data.
35Table 1
Parameter Values in the Calibrated Model.
The table reports the parameter values used to calibrate our model. The parameters of the processes
for the new-economy and old-economy aggregate pro¯tability are estimated by maximum likelihood from
the data on the aggregate pro¯tability of Nasdaq and NYSE/Amex ¯rms. The parameters of the individual
¯rm pro¯tability process are calibrated to the median Nasdaq ¯rm in our sample. The utility parameters
(´ and °), the parameters de¯ning the log surplus consumption ratio s(y)=a0 + a1yt + a2y2
t,a n dt h o s e
characterizing the state variable yt are calibrated to match the observed levels of the equity premium, market
volatility, aggregate M=B, and the interest rate. The means and standard deviations of the ¯tted quantities
are computed from the time series of the ¯tted values of the old economy's M/B ratio, conditional expected
excess return ¹mkt
R;t , conditional standard deviation of excess returns ¾mkt
R;t , and the real risk-free rate rf;t
over the period 1962-2002. All entries are annualized.
Old Economy Pro¯tability New Economy Pro¯tability Individ. Firm Pro¯tability
kL ½L ¾L;0 ¾L;L ÁN ¾0;N ¾N;N Ái ¾i;0 ¾i;i
0.3574 12.17% 1.47% 1.31% 0.3551 2.93% 4.88% 0.3891 6.65% 8.07%
Stochastic Discount Factor
´°k y y¾ y a0 a1 a2 ¹" ¾"
0.0471 3.9474 0.0367 -0.08% 25.30% -2.8780 0.3084 -0.0413 2% 1%






















1.77 5.06% 14.47% 6.25% 0.6477 1.72% 2.24% 1.55%
36Table 2
Nasdaq's Valuation on March 10, 2000 Assuming Zero Uncertainty
Panel A reports the model-implied M/B for the Nasdaq Composite Index on March 10, 2000, assuming
zero uncertainty about average excess pro¯tability Ã
N
. Panel B reports the model-implied return volatility
for Nasdaq under zero uncertainty. The observed M/B for Nasdaq on March 10, 2000 is 8.55. Nasdaq's
annualized standard deviation of daily returns in March 2000 is 41.49%, and its average monthly volatility
in 2000 is 47.03% per year. Nasdaq's most recent annualized pro¯tability (ROE in 1999Q4) is ½N
t =9 :96%
per year, and its most recent dividend yield (dividends over book equity in 1999) is c =1 :35% per year.
The expected time period over which the Nasdaq index can earn abnormal pro¯ts is E(T)=2 0y e a r s . A l l
variables (equity premium, b ÃN, and return volatility) are expressed in percent per year.
Excess ROE Equity Premium (% per year)
^ ÃN ( % p e r y e a r ) 1234567 8
Panel A: Model-implied M/B with zero uncertainty
( A c t u a lM / B :8 . 5 5 )
-5 1.46 1.41 1.30 1.18 1.04 0.89 0.74 0.56
0 3.33 3.02 2.63 2.23 1.84 1.47 1.12 0.76
1 4.15 3.70 3.17 2.64 2.14 1.68 1.25 0.83
2 5.27 4.62 3.89 3.19 2.53 1.95 1.41 0.90
3 6.83 5.89 4.87 3.92 3.05 2.29 1.62 1.00
4 9.06 7.68 6.23 4.92 3.75 2.74 1.88 1.11
5 12.28 10.22 8.15 6.31 4.71 3.36 2.23 1.26
6 17.02 13.92 10.90 8.28 6.04 4.19 2.69 1.45
7 24.09 19.38 14.91 11.12 7.93 5.36 3.32 1.69
8 34.80 27.55 20.85 15.28 10.67 7.02 4.20 2.02
Panel B: Model-implied return volatility with zero uncertainty
(Actual volatility: 41.49% in March 2000, 47.03% in 2000)
-5 15.47 16.94 18.07 18.90 19.50 19.83 19.83 19.25
0 18.09 20.17 21.76 22.93 23.76 24.18 24.10 23.04
1 18.69 20.93 22.65 23.92 24.83 25.31 25.22 24.05
2 19.31 21.71 23.57 24.97 25.97 26.52 26.46 25.18
3 19.93 22.50 24.52 26.05 27.18 27.83 27.81 26.45
4 20.54 23.30 25.47 27.16 28.44 29.21 29.27 27.85
5 21.14 24.07 26.42 28.27 29.72 30.66 30.85 29.42
6 21.71 24.82 27.34 29.37 31.01 32.15 32.52 31.15
7 22.25 25.53 28.23 30.44 32.28 33.65 34.27 33.05
8 22.76 26.20 29.06 31.45 33.51 35.13 36.05 35.10
37Table 3
Nasdaq's Valuation on March 10, 2000 Assuming Uncertainty of 3% Per Year
Panel A reports the model-implied M/B for the Nasdaq Composite Index on March 10, 2000, assuming
that uncertainty about average excess pro¯tability Ã
N
is 3% per year. Panel B reports the model-implied
return volatility for Nasdaq under 3% uncertainty. The observed M/B for Nasdaq on March 10, 2000 is 8.55.
Nasdaq's annualized standard deviation of daily returns in March 2000 is 41.49%, and its average monthly
volatility in 2000 is 47.03% per year. Nasdaq's most recent annualized pro¯tability (ROE in 1999Q4) is
½N
t =9 :96% per year, and its most recent dividend yield (dividends over book equity in 1999) is c =1 :35%
per year. The expected time period over which the Nasdaq index can earn abnormal pro¯ts is E(T)=2 0
years. All variables (equity premium, b ÃN, and return volatility) are expressed in percent per year.
Excess ROE Equity Premium (% per year)
^ ÃN ( % p e r y e a r ) 12345678
P a n e lA :M o d e l - i m p l i e dM / Bw i t h3 %u n c e r t a i n t y
( A c t u a lM / B :8 . 5 5 )
-5 1.70 1.61 1.46 1.30 1.13 0.95 0.78 0.58
0 4.70 4.09 3.43 2.81 2.23 1.72 1.26 0.82
1 6.16 5.27 4.33 3.47 2.69 2.02 1.44 0.90
2 8.29 6.95 5.59 4.39 3.33 2.43 1.67 1.00
3 11.44 9.40 7.41 5.69 4.21 2.99 1.98 1.13
4 16.17 13.03 10.07 7.57 5.46 3.76 2.40 1.30
5 23.39 18.53 14.05 10.35 7.29 4.87 2.99 1.52
6 34.59 26.96 20.10 14.53 9.99 6.49 3.83 1.82
7 52.23 40.10 29.44 20.91 14.08 8.89 5.04 2.24
8 80.36 60.90 44.08 30.83 20.36 12.54 6.86 2.85
Panel B: Model-implied return volatility with 3% uncertainty
(Actual volatility: 41.49% in March 2000, 47.03% in 2000)
-5 24.90 25.23 25.36 25.29 25.01 24.49 23.60 21.95
0 33.66 33.93 33.97 33.76 33.22 32.25 30.62 27.60
1 35.63 35.96 36.06 35.89 35.37 34.36 32.60 29.23
2 37.59 38.02 38.21 38.12 37.66 36.66 34.81 31.11
3 39.51 40.05 40.37 40.41 40.05 39.13 37.26 33.25
4 41.33 42.03 42.50 42.70 42.51 41.73 39.93 35.70
5 43.05 43.91 44.56 44.94 44.96 44.40 42.77 38.46
6 44.65 45.67 46.50 47.09 47.35 47.07 45.73 41.52
7 46.11 47.29 48.31 49.10 49.63 49.67 48.72 44.85
8 47.45 48.77 49.96 50.96 51.75 52.14 51.65 48.36
38Table 4
Matching Nasdaq's Valuation on March 10, 2000
Panel A reports the implied uncertainty for the Nasdaq Composite Index on March 10, 2000, i.e., the
uncertainty about average excess pro¯tability Ã
N
that equates Nasdaq's model-implied M/B to Nasdaq's
observed M/B of 8.55. Panel B reports the model-implied return volatility for Nasdaq computed under
implied uncertainty. Nasdaq's annualized standard deviation of daily returns in March 2000 is 41.49%, and
its average monthly volatility in 2000 is 47.03% per year. Nasdaq's most recent annualized pro¯tability (ROE
in 1999Q4) is ½N
t =9 :96% per year, and its most recent dividend yield (dividends over book equity in 1999)
is c =1 :35% per year. The expected time period over which the Nasdaq index can earn abnormal pro¯ts is
E(T) = 20 years. All variables (equity premium, expected excess pro¯tability b ÃN, implied uncertainty, and
return volatility) are expressed in percent per year.
Excess ROE Equity Premium (% per year)
^ ÃN ( % p e r y e a r ) 12345678
Panel A. Uncertainty needed to match the observed M/B
-5 6.41 6.60 6.81 7.04 7.29 7.57 7.89 8.36
0 4 . 3 94 . 7 15 . 0 65 . 4 35 . 8 16 . 2 26 . 6 77 . 2 7
1 3 . 8 14 . 1 74 . 5 95 . 0 15 . 4 45 . 8 96 . 3 87 . 0 3
2 3 . 0 83 . 5 44 . 0 44 . 5 35 . 0 35 . 5 46 . 0 86 . 7 7
3 2 . 0 82 . 7 33 . 3 83 . 9 84 . 5 75 . 1 55 . 7 56 . 5 0
4 0 . 0 01 . 4 52 . 5 13 . 3 24 . 0 44 . 7 15 . 3 96 . 2 2
5 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 9 72 . 4 33 . 4 04 . 2 25 . 0 05 . 9 1
6 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 7 82 . 5 63 . 6 34 . 5 65 . 5 8
7 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 01 . 1 82 . 9 04 . 0 65 . 2 3
8 0 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 00 . 0 01 . 8 63 . 4 74 . 8 4
Panel B. Model-implied return volatility under implied uncertainty
(Actual volatility: 41.49% in March 2000, 47.03% in 2000)
-5 141.49 151.69 165.51 182.07 202.27 226.99 258.78 307.51
0 64.69 73.70 85.81 100.56 119.11 142.51 173.80 223.37
1 51.35 60.15 71.80 85.98 103.93 126.70 157.49 206.85
2 38.94 47.54 58.69 72.23 89.41 111.45 141.54 190.50
3 27.79 36.12 46.66 59.43 75.73 96.84 126.12 174.41
4 20.54 26.53 36.07 47.81 63.03 83.03 111.22 158.63
5 21.14 24.07 27.70 37.78 51.53 70.16 96.98 143.20
6 21.71 24.82 27.34 30.14 41.66 58.44 83.59 128.22
7 22.25 25.53 28.23 30.44 34.09 48.24 71.18 113.79
8 22.76 26.20 29.06 31.45 33.51 40.08 60.04 100.05
39Table 5
Matching Nasdaq's Valuation on March 10, 2000 With Di®erent Horizons
The table is an equivalent of Table 4 with expected time horizons of E(T) = 15 and 25 years.
Excess ROE Equity Premium (% per year) Equity Premium (% per year)
^ Ãi ( % p e r y e a r ) 123456 1 2 3 4 5 6
Implied Uncertainty (% per year) Implied Return Volatility (% per year)
(Actual volatility: 41.49% in March 2000, 47.03% in 2000)
P a n e lA :E [ T ]=1 5
-5 7.17 7.35 7.55 7.76 8.00 8.26 168.07 178.26 192.54 209.97 231.48 257.78
0 5.41 5.67 5.97 6.30 6.64 7.01 87.17 96.09 108.72 124.44 144.37 169.68
1 4.93 5.23 5.57 5.93 6.31 6.72 72.82 81.45 93.63 108.81 128.21 152.94
2 4.39 4.73 5.12 5.53 5.96 6.40 59.16 67.59 79.31 93.91 112.62 136.69
3 3.74 4.14 4.61 5.08 5.56 6.06 46.32 54.55 65.80 79.75 97.72 121.02
4 2.92 3.43 4.00 4.56 5.12 5.69 34.43 42.48 53.21 66.46 83.56 105.92
5 1.68 2.48 3.25 3.96 4.63 5.27 23.93 31.70 41.76 54.17 70.31 91.60
6 0.00 0.52 2.22 3.20 4.04 4.81 20.00 23.01 31.87 43.13 58.06 78.11
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.15 3.33 4.28 20.56 23.39 25.66 33.81 47.11 65.61
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.37 3.64 21.09 24.09 26.52 28.48 37.85 54.32
P a n e lB :E [ T ]=2 5
-5 5.92 6.12 6.34 6.58 6.84 7.12 126.31 136.50 149.96 165.95 185.35 208.90
0 3.70 4.06 4.46 4.86 5.27 5.70 52.11 61.22 72.98 87.11 104.74 126.87
1 3.00 3.44 3.93 4.39 4.87 5.35 39.57 48.47 59.75 73.27 90.21 111.67
2 2.02 2.66 3.28 3.86 4.42 4.96 28.34 36.94 47.60 60.37 76.49 97.12
3 0.00 1.43 2.44 3.21 3.89 4.53 21.07 27.30 36.94 48.67 63.72 83.30
4 0.00 0.00 0.97 2.35 3.27 4.04 21.69 24.75 28.54 38.61 52.20 70.43
5 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.73 2.45 3.47 22.28 25.52 28.15 31.00 42.36 58.76
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.07 2.75 22.83 26.24 29.05 31.37 34.89 48.64
7 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.70 23.33 26.90 29.88 32.39 34.59 40.67
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 23.78 27.50 30.64 33.33 35.75 37.81
40Table 6
Matching the Valuations of Selected Technology Firms on March 10, 2000
The table reports the implied uncertainty for selected technology ¯rms on March 10, 2000, i.e., the
uncertainty about average excess pro¯tability Ã
i
that equates the ¯rm's model-implied M/B to its observed
M/B. The table also reports the model-implied return volatility computed under the corresponding value of
implied uncertainty. Each ¯rm's name is accompanied by the ¯rm's market capitalization on March 10, 2000,
the ¯rm's observed M/B on the same day, the 1999 values of the ¯rm's realized pro¯tability ½i
t and dividend
yield ci, as well as two estimates of the ¯rm's actual return volatility: the standard deviation of the stock's
daily returns in March 2000, and the average monthly volatility in 2000, in that order. The expected time
period over which the ¯rms can earn abnormal pro¯ts is E(T) = 15 years. All variables (equity premium,
expected excess pro¯tability b Ãi, and implied uncertainty) are expressed in percent per year.
Excess ROE Equity Premium (% per year) Equity Premium (% per year)
^ Ãi ( % p e r y e a r ) 123456 1 2 3 4 5 6
Implied Uncertainty (% per year) Implied Return Volatility (% per year)
AKAMAI ($26.15bn): M=B =9 2 :92, ½t = ¡20:15%, c = 0, Return volatility: (88:98%;141:91%)
-2 6.39 6.54 6.70 6.87 7.06 7.28 142.70 150.38 158.85 167.95 178.30 190.34
0 5.86 6.02 6.20 6.39 6.60 6.83 122.39 130.18 138.76 147.95 158.42 170.57
2 5.26 5.45 5.65 5.86 6.10 6.36 102.55 110.45 119.09 128.35 138.87 151.09
4 4.57 4.79 5.03 5.27 5.54 5.83 83.44 91.43 100.09 109.33 119.85 132.06
6 3.73 4.01 4.30 4.60 4.91 5.25 65.51 73.54 82.14 91.26 101.64 113.71
8 2.59 3.00 3.40 3.78 4.17 4.58 49.56 57.53 65.86 74.65 84.67 96.40
10 0.00 1.32 2.10 2.70 3.25 3.78 38.18 44.72 52.34 60.40 69.67 80.66
AMAZON ($23.45bn): M=B =8 8 :07, ½t = ¡126:08%, c = 0, Return volatility: (71:67%;103:33%)
0 6.94 7.07 7.21 7.35 7.52 7.72 171.63 178.75 186.55 194.90 204.44 215.59
4 5.96 6.12 6.28 6.46 6.65 6.88 131.76 139.13 147.12 155.65 165.36 176.67
8 4.77 4.97 5.18 5.40 5.64 5.91 93.21 100.84 109.01 117.66 127.45 138.83
10 4.02 4.26 4.51 4.77 5.05 5.35 74.95 82.72 90.93 99.57 109.32 120.64
12 3.09 3.40 3.72 4.03 4.37 4.72 58.02 65.89 74.04 82.55 92.14 103.25
16 0.00 0.00 0.67 1.74 2.45 3.07 39.16 43.49 47.87 54.99 63.18 72.94
CIENA ($23.40bn): M=B =4 1 :24, ½t = ¡2:25%, c = 0, Return volatility: (116:68%;121:45%)
-2 5.79 5.97 6.16 6.36 6.57 6.82 115.02 123.03 132.00 141.70 152.78 165.66
0 5.16 5.37 5.58 5.81 6.06 6.33 95.07 103.13 112.13 121.85 132.98 145.92
2 4.42 4.67 4.93 5.20 5.48 5.79 76.12 84.20 93.12 102.76 113.81 126.70
4 3.49 3.82 4.15 4.48 4.82 5.19 58.74 66.76 75.48 84.86 95.64 108.29
6 2.14 2.66 3.14 3.59 4.04 4.49 43.90 51.68 59.93 68.78 79.00 91.11
8 0.00 0.00 1.51 2.34 3.02 3.63 37.53 41.40 47.69 55.51 64.69 75.81
CISCO ($455.72bn): M=B =3 9 :02, ½t =2 6 :58%, c = 0, Return volatility: (49:81%;68:88%)
0 4.59 4.84 5.10 5.37 5.65 5.97 76.33 84.39 93.52 103.50 115.05 128.59
2 3.67 3.99 4.33 4.66 5.00 5.37 58.84 66.78 75.62 85.30 96.53 109.80
4 2.34 2.85 3.33 3.78 4.23 4.68 43.92 51.59 59.90 68.96 79.57 92.25
6 0.00 0.00 1.77 2.57 3.24 3.85 36.69 40.28 47.41 55.42 64.93 76.56
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.65 2.72 37.57 41.46 44.74 47.57 53.68 63.61
DELL ($129.88bn): M=B =2 4 :47, ½t =5 8 :55%, c = 0, Return volatility: (51:75%;69:50%)
-4 5.05 5.29 5.55 5.82 6.10 6.41 76.88 84.69 94.10 104.81 117.48 132.54
-2 4.15 4.47 4.80 5.13 5.48 5.84 59.28 66.80 75.76 85.97 98.19 112.93
0 2.90 3.37 3.85 4.30 4.75 5.19 44.30 51.44 59.71 69.14 80.56 94.57
2 0.00 1.42 2.43 3.17 3.82 4.41 34.31 39.50 46.77 55.06 65.25 78.05
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.97 2.46 3.40 35.64 38.92 41.52 44.60 53.07 64.11
41Table 6 (continued)
Excess ROE Equity Premium (% per year) Equity Premium (% per year)
^ Ãi ( % p e r y e a r ) 123456 1 2 3 4 5 6
Implied Uncertainty (% per year) Implied Return Volatility (% per year)
EBAY ($23.76bn): M=B =2 7 :87, ½t =7 :79%, c = 0, Return volatility: (129:24%;113:64%)
-4 6.03 6.20 6.38 6.58 6.79 7.03 119.33 127.40 136.60 146.59 158.06 171.40
-2 5.42 5.62 5.83 6.05 6.29 6.56 99.01 107.11 116.29 126.33 137.86 151.29
0 4.71 4.94 5.20 5.45 5.73 6.04 79.70 87.76 96.87 106.81 118.26 131.68
2 3.83 4.13 4.45 4.77 5.10 5.45 61.89 69.87 78.74 88.42 99.62 112.81
4 2.61 3.06 3.51 3.93 4.35 4.78 46.43 54.18 62.59 71.74 82.40 95.09
6 0.00 1.15 2.12 2.80 3.41 3.98 36.63 41.92 49.45 57.65 67.34 79.09
8 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.00 2.92 37.55 41.43 44.68 47.48 55.45 65.65
IMMUNEX ($37.56bn): M=B = 105:70, ½t =1 7 :91%, c = 0, Return volatility: (155:94%;117:71%)
-4 6.54 6.68 6.84 7.01 7.20 7.42 145.55 153.37 162.07 171.46 182.16 194.58
-2 6.01 6.17 6.35 6.54 6.75 6.98 124.88 132.81 141.62 151.12 161.95 174.52
0 5.42 5.60 5.81 6.02 6.25 6.51 104.71 112.71 121.59 131.15 142.06 154.72
2 4.73 4.96 5.19 5.44 5.70 5.99 85.30 93.36 102.24 111.78 122.68 135.35
4 3.91 4.19 4.48 4.77 5.08 5.42 67.10 75.17 83.94 93.35 104.09 116.64
6 2.82 3.21 3.60 3.98 4.36 4.77 50.84 58.82 67.30 76.36 86.74 98.93
8 0.56 1.68 2.38 2.94 3.47 3.99 38.00 45.52 53.32 61.65 71.28 82.74
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 1.12 2.20 2.99 38.20 42.29 45.81 50.50 58.74 68.90
INTEL ($395.49bn): M=B =1 1 :09, ½t =2 8 :65%, c =0 :0148, Return volatility: (45:81%;68:71%)
-2 5.11 5.38 5.68 5.98 6.30 6.64 70.70 78.20 87.56 98.52 111.75 127.82
0 4.11 4.47 4.86 5.25 5.64 6.05 54.00 61.14 69.90 80.13 92.66 108.13
2 2.64 3.22 3.80 4.34 4.86 5.37 40.09 46.82 54.75 64.01 75.48 89.94
4 0.00 0.00 2.08 3.05 3.84 4.54 33.53 36.26 42.85 50.81 60.83 73.79
6 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 2.27 3.44 34.86 37.98 40.40 42.26 49.42 60.38
MICROSOFT ($516.00bn): M=B =1 8 :79, ½t =4 8 :28%, c = 0, Return volatility: (57:44%;56:10%)
-4 5.04 5.28 5.55 5.82 6.10 6.41 76.54 84.32 93.70 104.37 117.01 132.05
-2 4.15 4.46 4.80 5.13 5.48 5.84 59.01 66.50 75.42 85.60 97.80 112.50
0 2.89 3.36 3.84 4.30 4.74 5.19 44.10 51.21 59.44 68.84 80.22 94.20
2 0.00 1.40 2.42 3.16 3.81 4.41 34.24 39.33 46.58 54.83 64.97 77.74
4 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.93 2.45 3.39 35.61 38.87 41.44 44.42 52.86 63.86
PRICELINE ($15.94bn): M=B =3 9 :58, ½t = ¡264:12%, c = 0, Return volatility: (128:17%;133:65%)
0 7.82 7.93 8.05 8.17 8.32 8.49 217.10 223.77 231.08 238.95 247.98 258.58
2 7.42 7.54 7.66 7.80 7.95 8.13 197.18 203.93 211.33 219.25 228.36 239.02
4 7.00 7.12 7.25 7.40 7.56 7.75 177.34 184.19 191.66 199.68 208.84 219.56
6 6.55 6.68 6.82 6.98 7.15 7.35 157.62 164.57 172.13 180.22 189.44 200.25
8 6.06 6.20 6.36 6.52 6.71 6.93 138.07 145.13 152.78 160.94 170.24 181.09
10 5.52 5.68 5.85 6.03 6.24 6.47 118.76 125.96 133.70 141.92 151.27 162.18
12 4.92 5.10 5.29 5.50 5.73 5.98 99.83 107.17 115.01 123.29 132.68 143.59
RED HAT ($10.43bn): M=B =2 6 :50, ½t = ¡10:15%, c = 0, Return volatility: (121:00%;122:33%)
-4 6.23 6.39 6.57 6.75 6.96 7.18 129.65 137.61 146.60 156.34 167.48 180.41
-2 5.66 5.84 6.04 6.25 6.47 6.73 109.13 117.17 126.23 136.05 147.28 160.34
0 5.00 5.22 5.45 5.69 5.94 6.23 89.38 97.47 106.50 116.31 127.54 140.64
2 4.22 4.49 4.76 5.05 5.35 5.67 70.80 78.86 87.78 97.44 108.56 121.56
4 3.21 3.57 3.94 4.29 4.66 5.05 54.04 61.98 70.61 79.94 90.70 103.38
6 1.57 2.25 2.83 3.34 3.83 4.31 40.23 47.82 55.85 64.51 74.58 86.59
8 0.00 0.00 0.42 1.88 2.70 3.40 37.52 41.38 44.83 52.25 61.08 71.91
YAHOO ($98.90bn): M=B =7 8 :41, ½t =1 0 :52%, c = 0, Return volatility: (75:41%;90:61%)
-2 5.95 6.12 6.30 6.49 6.70 6.94 122.40 130.35 139.20 148.76 159.64 172.29
0 5.35 5.55 5.75 5.97 6.20 6.46 102.28 110.29 119.20 128.80 139.77 152.50
2 4.66 4.89 5.13 5.38 5.65 5.94 82.96 91.03 99.93 109.50 120.44 133.17
4 3.81 4.10 4.40 4.70 5.02 5.36 64.94 73.01 81.78 91.18 101.95 114.52
6 2.67 3.08 3.49 3.89 4.28 4.70 49.01 56.95 65.39 74.40 84.75 96.93
8 0.00 1.39 2.19 2.81 3.36 3.90 37.55 44.13 51.81 60.03 69.56 80.96
10 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.63 2.02 2.86 38.20 42.29 45.80 49.39 57.44 67.43
428. Appendix
(A) The Stochastic Discount Factor
The properties of the SDF are described in detail in PV (2004). This appendix contains a
brief summary. The process in equation (10) implies a normal unconditional distribution for yt
with mean y and variance ¾2
y=2ky.L e t yD = y ¡ 4¾y=
p
2ky and yU = y +4 ¾y=
p
2ky be the
boundaries between which yt lies 99.9% of the time. To ensure that st (log surplus) conforms to
the economic intuition of a habit formation model, PV (2004) impose the following parametric





: The resulting process for the stochastic
discount factor ¼t = e¡´t¡°("t+st) is given by
d¼t = ¡rf;t¼tdt ¡ ¼t¾¼;tdW0;t;
where
rf;t = R0 + R1yt + R2y2
t;
with























¾¼;t = ° (¾" +( a1 +2 a2yt)¾y):
The parameter restrictions imposed earlier imply that ¾¼;t decreases as yt increases. As a result,
expected return and return volatility are low when yt is high. See PV (2004) for more details.
(B) Proofs








t and ½t follow the processes in equations (2) and (4), and ³i are constants. De¯ne Yt = ³







2;T,w h e r ev is a constant, Yi;t denotes the










where K0 (t;T), K(t;T)=( K1 (t;T);::;K 5 (t;T))
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y (20)
43subject to the ¯nal condition K6 (T;T)=¡°a2; K(T;T)=( 1 ;¡°a1;0;0;0); and K0 (T;T)=0 .
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P r o o fo fL e m m a1 :From the de¯nition of the vector Yt,w eh a v e
dYt =( AY + BY Yt)dt + §Y dWt:























ij = ´H (21)
subject to the boundary condition
H (YT;T;T)=g(YT): (22)
It can be easily veri¯ed that the exponential quadratic function (17) indeed satis¯es (21) subject
to (22), as long as K0 (t;T); K(t;T); and K6 (t;T) are the solutions to the system of ODEs in
(18) through (20) under the ¯nal conditions presented in the claim of the Lemma.¥
Lemma 2. If average excess pro¯tability Ã
i
t is observable and Ti is known, the ¯rm's ratio of









































is the vector of state variables characterizing ¯rm i, e Q0 (s)=
K0 (0;s);Q i (s)=Ki+1 (0;s)f o ri =2 ;3;4;Q 1 (s)=K2 (0;s)+°a1,a n dQ5 (s)=K6 (0;s)+°a2;
where Ki (:;s) are in Lemma 1, all for the parameterization ³0 =0 ,³1 = v =1 ,a n d³2 = ci.
























































1 = 0 in equation (19). This implies
dK1(t;Ti)
dt =0a n dt h u sK1 (t;Ti)=1f o r















This expression leads immediately to the claim upon rede¯nition of the variables. ¥
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n1 :
The density of the exponential distribution is h(s;p)=pe¡ps: We assume throughout that
parameters are chosen such that Q0 (s)=¡ps+ e Q0 (s) !¡ 1 ,a n da l lQi (s)f o ri 6 =0c o n v e r g et o
¯nite numbers, where e Q0 (s)a n dQi (s) are de¯ned in Lemma 2. Such parameters exist, because
BY in Lemma 1 has negative eigevalues, and thus the convergence conditions are met for instance
if §Y = 0. We now prove Proposition 1 under these conditions.













































































































Under the assumption stated earlier (Q0 (s) !¡ 1and Qi (s)'s converge to ¯nite numbers), we









ds ! 0a sT !1 . From equation (20), the leading term in











ds as T !1are determined by a term of the form
R T
t em(s¡t)ds
for some constant m determined as part of the solution of (20). Under the assumptions stated
earlier, e¡p(T¡t) R T
t em(s¡t)ds =1 =m
¡
e(¡p+m)(T¡t) ¡ e¡p(T¡t)¢

























Substituting this back into equation (23), we ¯nd the relation (13) in Proposition 1. ¥













































Under the assumptions stated in the proof of Proposition 1, the integral exists. The only variable




























Proposition 3: The M/B value of the old economy is given by
MO
t =BO












0 (s)=K0 (0;s);Q O
1 (s)=K2 (0;s)+°a1, QO
2 (s)=K3 (0;s)a n dQO
3 (s)=K6 (0;s)+°a2,
where Ki (:;s) are in Lemma 1, all for the parametrization ³0 = ³2 = v =1 ,a n d³1 =0 :
P r o o fo fP r o p o s i t i o n3 : The claim follows from the same argument as in Proposition 1, but
for the parameterization ³0 = ³2 = v =1 ,a n d³1 = 0 in Lemma 1. The functions of time QO
j (s),
j =0 ;::;3, are computed as in Proposition 1. ¥
Lemma 3. (e.g., Du±e, 1996). For any linear vector process zt that satis¯es
dzt =( Az + Bzzt)dt + §zdWt; (25)
we have
zt+¿jzt » N (¹z (zt;¿);Sz (¿));
where ¹z and Sz are given by









and ª(¿)=Ue¤¿U¡1,w h e r e¤ is the diagonal matrix with the eigenvalues of Bz on its principal
diagonal, U is the matrix collecting the respective eigenvectors on each column, and e¤¿ is the
diagonal matrix with e¸ii¿ on its principal diagonal.
(C) The Gordon growth model with an uncertain growth rate.
This section formalizes the discussion in the third paragraph of the introduction. The Gordon
model assumes that the drift rate g of dividends is constant:
dDt
Dt
= gdt + ¾DdWD:
46The Gordon model also assumes a constant discount rate. This assumption can be formalized by
assuming an exogenous stochastic discount factor with constant drift and volatility:
d¼t
¼t
= ¡rfdt ¡ ¾¼dW¼:
















assuming that the expectation exists. Let xt =l o g( ¼tDt) .I t o ' sl e m m ai m p l i e st h a t
dxt =
µ









dt ¡ ¾¼dWt + ¾DdWD;































where r = rf + ¾¼¾D½D;¼ is the sum of the risk-free rate and the risk premium. This is the
well-known Gordon growth formula in a continuous-time framework.























That is, the P/D ratio is equal to the expectation of the P/D ratio in the case where g is known.
Note that this expectation exists only under the assumption that the distribution of g assigns
positive likelihood only to the values of g that satisfy a transversality condition. Also note that the
risk premium is unchanged compared to the case of known g. By explicitly modeling the learning
process, this fact can be proven directly by adapting the results in Veronesi (2000).
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